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I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Brexit referendum, Eleanor Sharpston, the current 
British Advocate General to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”), said in an interview that “[t]he United Kingdom has 
made a very strong contribution to this court and the evolution of EU 
law since it joined in terms of injecting a degree of pragmatism . . . . 
Some very good [UK] people have served in the court – Lord Gordon 
Slynn, Sir Konrad Schiemann and Sir Francis Jacobs – and they have 
made a difference . . . . it would be a pity to lose this contribution.”1 
One area in which UK Advocates General made a distinctive and 
																																																																																																																												
1. Owen Bowcott, “We don’t decide national cases”: ECJ veteran swipes away Euro-
sceptic barbs, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/apr/19/we-
dont-decide-national-cases-ecj-veteran-swipes-away-eurosceptic-barbs. 
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tangible contribution is the equality law that emerged from the CJEU. 
The United Kingdom played a significant role in this body of law 
through preliminary references from its courts as well as opinions by 
its advocates general. Because the United Kingdom had a more 
developed antidiscrimination law than other member states, 
references from its courts created occasions for the CJEU to define 
key concepts in equal pay and equal treatment law, particularly 
indirect discrimination and the justifications given to defeat prima 
facie cases of discrimination. In cases that originated in other member 
states, specifically regarding the scope of positive action, the special 
protection of motherhood, and discrimination on grounds of religion, 
Britain influenced the jurisprudence both by participating directly in 
the litigation, and through strong Advocate General opinions. As the 
process by which Britain leaves the European Union unfolds, one can 
only speculate about how EU law will evolve without Britain. This 
Essay analyzes the British contributions to EU equality law to 
understand the perspective that will soon be absent. 
II. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 
A. Jenkins v. Kingsgate: The Prima Facie Case 
Many significant decisions of the CJEU defining discrimination 
and setting forth the legal framework by which discrimination can be 
established were the result of preliminary references by British courts 
in cases alleging sex discrimination. In 1981, the Court of Justice 
articulated the indirect discrimination theory in construing the Equal 
Pay guarantee of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (“EEC Treaty”). Jenkins v. Kingsgate 2  is significant 
because it imported an American concept – that of disparate impact 
discrimination – into European jurisprudence, and applied that 
concept to the law of equal pay between men and women, a context in 
which US courts have to date rejected the disparate impact theory.3 
The case was referred to the Court of Justice by the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal (“EAT”) in the United Kingdom. The female 
																																																																																																																												
2. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., Case 96-20, [1981] E.C.R. 911. 
3. See Julie C. Suk, Disparate Impact Abroad, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNIT-
IES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT at 50, at 283, 290-91 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos eds., 
2015). 
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plaintiff, Mrs. Jenkins, was a part-time worker who had been 
receiving an hourly rate of pay lower than that paid to one of her male 
colleagues, a full-time worker. She was represented by Anthony 
Lester, who had visited the United States in the early 1970s4 and had 
explicitly embraced the US Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Company holding that a racially neutral practice could 
constitute illegal discrimination under Title VII if not justified by the 
employer’s business necessity. 5  In the proceedings before the 
Industrial Tribunal, Lester had argued that, while unequal treatment 
between part-time and full-time workers was not based directly or 
intentionally on sex, it constituted indirect discrimination in this 
instance, because of the insufficiency of the employer’s justification 
for the practice.6 The Industrial Tribunal had decided the case under 
the British Equal Pay Act of 1970, and had taken an approach quite 
similar to US courts on equal pay. Specifically, the Industrial Tribunal 
had taken the view that, if a part-time worker’s weekly working hours 
only constituted 75% of the working hours of a full-time employee, 
this difference between the part-time worker and the full-time worker 
was sufficiently material that it could not constitute unequal treatment 
on the basis of sex.7 
When the plaintiff appealed, the EAT determined that this 
construction of the UK Equal Pay Act might be in conflict with the 
equal pay guarantee at Article 119 of the EEC Treaty. The EAT 
raised the question of whether equal pay for equal work required the 
same rate of pay for the same work, in the absence of a showing that 
the employer had any commercial benefit from encouraging every 
worker to work full time.8  It also asked whether it was relevant if a 
considerably smaller proportion of female workers than of male 
workers was able to perform the minimum number of hours each 
week required to qualify for the full hourly rate of pay.9 The CJEU 
concluded that the difference in pay between full-time and part-time 
																																																																																																																												
4 . See Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Anthony Lester), Making Discrimination Law 
Effective: Old Barriers and New Frontiers, 2 INT’L J. DISCRIMINATION & L. 161, 178 (1997). 
5. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
6. See Jenkins, [1981] E.C.R. 911, ¶ 4. 
7. See id. The lower court’s approach is similar to that under the US Equal Pay Act, 
which permits permits differences in pay based on any factor other than sex. Equal Pay Act of 
1963 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (2017). 
8. Jenkins, [1981] E.C.R. 911, ¶ 8. 
9. Id.. 
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workers would not amount to discrimination prohibited by the equal 
pay guarantee of the treaty “unless it is in reality merely an indirect 
way of reducing the pay of part-time workers on the ground that that 
group of workers is composed exclusively or predominantly of 
women.”10 Nonetheless, it left open the possibility for plaintiffs to 
prove that an employer was indirectly discriminating on the basis of 
sex by using a factor other than sex. 
In this litigation, Mrs. Jenkins was supported by the Equal 
Opportunities Commission, the agency created by the Sex 
Discrimination Act to enforce sex discrimination law and to promote 
women’s equality in the workplace. The British government 
participated in the preliminary reference proceeding, in support of the 
clothing manufacturer employer’s approach to equal pay. The Jenkins 
case illustrates how divisions within Britain regarding how to 
approach gender inequality in the workplace were brought to the 
European arena, with far-reaching effects for all the member states. 
The position ultimately adopted by the CJEU rejects the proposal that 
national courts should scrutinize, on the basis of the equal pay 
provision of the EEC Treaty, any form of non-sex-based unequal 
treatment that lacks a commercial justification. Rather, the Court 
adopts an approach quite similar to that advanced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Griggs. A practice lacking a business justification 
is scrutinized under Griggs only after a prima facie showing that it 
disproportionately disadvantages a group protected under the 
antidiscrimination statute. In Jenkins, the practice of paying part-time 
workers a lower hourly rate of pay than full-time workers is subject to 
scrutiny only when and because the practice has a disproportionate 
effect on women.11 
The approach adopted by the Court was advanced by Advocate 
General Warner, the British advocate general to the CJEU from 1973-
81. What is most striking about AG Warner’s opinion in Jenkins is his 
engagement with US law, at the urging of Jenkins’ counsel, Anthony 
Lester. Warner notes: 
At the hearing Counsel for Mrs. Jenkins explained that . . . if, as 
was clearly the case, women were less able to work 40 hours a 
week than men, because of their family responsibilities, the 
																																																																																																																												
10. Id. ¶22. 
11. Id. ¶ 13. 
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requirement that an employee should work 40 hours a week to 
earn the full hourly rate must obviously hit, in a disproportionate 
way, at women, compared with men. That did not necessarily 
mean that there was discrimination, but it did mean that there was 
prima-facie discrimination in effect, which required ‘some 
special justification from the employer.’ Counsel called this the 
‘Griggs approach’ after the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971) 401 US 
424.12 
By way of the British advocate general and the litigating position 
of British litigants, US antidiscrimination law also traveled to Europe 
in the Jenkins case. The doctrine of indirect discrimination therefore 
became distinct from a general requirement that employers justify all 
forms of unjustified unequal treatment based on factors other than sex. 
In Jenkins, the doctrine was concerned with forms of unjustified 
treatment based on factors other than sex only when there was a 
disparate impact on women. 
B. Enderby v. Frenchay: Employer’s Objective Justification 
Another significant refinement of the CJEU’s indirect 
discrimination concept came through a preliminary reference about a 
decade following Jenkins v. Kingsgate. In Enderby v. Frenchay,13 the 
Court of Appeal for England and Wales referred to CJEU the question 
of whether the employer must objectively justify differences in pay 
between job categories when the employees occupying each category 
of job were disproportionately one sex. The Industrial Tribunal within 
Britain had held that the differences in pay resulted from the 
structures specific to the professions and from collective bargaining 
agreements, and not from sex. In Enderby, a female speech therapist 
claimed that the lower pay of speech therapists (predominantly 
women) relative to pharmacists (predominantly men) had to be 
justified objectively by the employer.14 The CJEU agreed. It determ-
ined that the mere fact of separate collective bargaining processes 
could not suffice to constitute an objective justification for the 
disparity in pay. Furthermore, the state of the employment market 
																																																																																																																												
12. Opinion of Advocate General Warner, Jenkins, [1981] E.C.R. 929, 937. 
13. Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority, Case C-127/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-5566. 
14. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
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could form an objective justification, if the predominantly male jobs 
are paid at a higher rate because of the scarcity of workers willing to 
perform that job and the employer’s need to attract employees into 
that job. 
In Enderby, the German government had taken the position that 
the job of speech therapist and pharmacist were not comparable, and 
therefore, there was no need to examine the employer’s justifications 
for paying different salaries under Article 119.15 By contrast, British 
courts had taken an approach requiring and evaluating the objective 
justification before making the determination of whether the two jobs 
were comparable. 
Enderby is an illustration of how litigation before the CJEU 
created a discursive space for dialogue between German and British 
approaches to the law of gender equality. As Claire Kilpatrick 
observed, Germany and the United Kingdom have been key players in 
making EC gender equality dialogue happen.16 Courts in Germany 
and the United Kingdom were responsible for most of the preliminary 
references to CJEU on gender equality issues during the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s, when the CJEU established many important legal 
principles in equality and non-discrimination. 
III. GENDER QUOTAS AND POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION 
In recent years, the European Commission has proposed a new 
directive requiring gender balance on corporate boards of directors.17 
Since the proposal in 2012, the United Kingdom has been one of the 
most vocal opponents of the proposed EU legislation. The UK has 
invoked subsidiarity to oppose the directive.18 But the opposition is 
not merely about the competence of the EU to legislate in this area. 
The hostility to gender quotas on the EU level is consistent with the 
UK’s litigating position in several positive discrimination cases in 
																																																																																																																												
15. Id. ¶ 8. 
16. See Claire Kilpatrick, Gender Equality: A Fundamental Dialogue, in LABOUR LAW 
AND THE COURTS: NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 31, 41 (Silvana 
Sciarra ed., 2001). 
17. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies 
listed on stock exchanges and related measures, COM (2012) 614 final, (Nov. 2012). 
18. See Matthew Holehouse, Britain seeks to halt EU gender quota plan, TELEGRAPH, 
Dec. 4, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/12034462/Britain-seeks-
to-halt-EU-gender-quota-plan.html. 
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which the CJEU developed its jurisprudential limitations on gender 
quotas. 
The line of cases is well known. In four cases, three of which 
were referred by German courts, and one by a Swedish tribunal, the 
CJEU established the following approach: The Equal Treatment 
Directive prohibits a preference to the candidate of the 
underrepresented sex when choosing between two or more candidates 
with equal qualifications, unless the positive action scheme includes 
the possibility of overcoming the sex-based preference based on 
circumstances unique to the individual being considered.19 Indeed, 
within Germany, where these cases originated, there were divisions 
within the legal community as to whether gender quotas in the civil 
service should be permitted, and if so, how rigid any sex-based 
preference could be in light of equality guarantees in both the German 
constitution and European law. The divisions within Germany 
migrated and took center stage at the European court. The litigating 
position of the UK government, and a robust Advocate General 
opinion by British Advocate General Jacobs in one of the cases, 
helped shape the EU law of affirmative action in a very restricted 
direction. 
In the Kalanke case, the CJEU determined that the Bremen Law 
on Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the Public Service went 
against the European Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC).20 The 
Bremen law provided that, if women made up less than half the staff 
in certain job categories, the female candidate would automatically be 
given priority in hiring for such a job, but only if she were equally 
qualified to the male candidate. In this proceeding, both the United 
Kingdom and the European Commission participated. The UK 
government supported the male plaintiff’s position urging that the 
Bremen law was inconsistent with the equal treatment guarantee in 
the directive, whereas the European Commission defended the law in 
light of the European policy of promoting real equality between men 
and women. 
																																																																																																																												
19. See Badeck and Others, Case C-158/97, [2000] E.C.R. I-1902; Abrahamsson and 
Anderson v. Fogelqvist, Case C-407/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-5562; Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Case C-409/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-6383; Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case 
C-450/93, [1995] E.C.R I-3069. 
20. See Kalanke, [1995] E.C.R I-3069. 
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Shortly thereafter, the CJEU took a somewhat more permissive 
approach towards positive discrimination. In Marschall v. Land 
Nordrhein-Westphalen21 in 1997, the CJEU upheld a positive action 
program that was nearly identical to that at issue in Kalanke, with one 
significant difference: the preference for the equally qualified female 
candidate was not automatic, and could be overcome by reasons 
specific to an individual male candidate to tilt the balance in his favor. 
In addition, in this proceeding, the UK was not the only national 
government to participate. The Austrian, Finnish, Swedish, and 
Norwegian governments defended the national rule, taking a position 
similar to the one that ultimately prevailed. On the other hand, the UK 
and France argued that the affirmative action program did not come 
within the scope of the derogation in Article 2(4) of the directive. Just 
two years after that, France amended its constitution to require 
statutes to promote equal access by men and women to elected office, 
effectively permitting gender quotas. 22  The UK, by contrast, 
continued to articulate a position that was hostile to gender quotas. 
In the Marschall case, the UK Advocate General Francis Jacobs 
issued an opinion urging the court to invalidate the affirmative action 
program. 23  He quoted and cited an industrial tribunal in the UK 
considering the lawfulness of all-women shortlists for the selection of 
Labour Party candidates for certain positions: 
It may well be that many would regard [redressing the imbalance 
between the sexes in the House of Commons] as a laudable 
motive but that is of no relevance to the issue of whether the 
arrangement as applied to the facts before us results in direct 
unlawful sex discrimination against the two male applicants.24 
Advocate General Jacobs’ approach can be contrasted with that 
of Advocate General Tesauro in his opinion for the Kalanke case. AG 
Tesauro, while arguing against the automatic preference for the 
female candidate authorized by the Bremen law, nonetheless 
																																																																																																																												
21. See Marschall, [1997] E.C.R. I-6383. 
22 . See Loi constitutionnelle 99-569 du 8 juillet 1999 relative à l’égalité entre les 
femmes et les hommes [Constitutional Law 99-569 of July 8, 1999 Concerning Equality 
Between Women and Men], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 9, 1999, p. 10175 (Fr.). 
23. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Marschall, [1997] E.C.R. I-6365. 
24. Id. ¶ 46 (citing Jepson v. The Labour Party [1996] INDUS. REL. L. REP. 116, 117 
(UK)). 
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presented a long discussion of substantive equality, and was mindful 
of the “particular social structure which penalizes women, in 
particular because of their dual role, on account of past 
discrimination.” 25  British AG Jacobs’ opinion in Marschall went 
against the approach adopted by the court in that particular case. 
Jacobs argued against sex-based preferences, even in circumstances 
where the affirmative action scheme left some flexibility for the 
consideration of individual circumstances of the male applicant. 
There is absolutely no recognition of the concept of substantive 
equality or the need for some forms of affirmative action to 
compensate for women’s disadvantage. 
However, the more restrictive British approach to affirmative 
action won the day in a later case, decided in 2000, on preliminary 
reference from Sweden.26 In that case, a Swedish university had given 
a preference to a female candidate for a professorship pursuant to a 
regulation that required a preference for the candidate belonging to an 
under-represented sex.27 Under the regulation, as long as a woman 
had sufficient qualifications for the post, she could be chosen over a 
male candidate who would otherwise have been chosen, provided that 
the difference in their respective qualifications was not so great as to 
be contrary to the requirement of objectivity in making 
appointments.28 Although both the male and female candidates were 
sufficiently qualified for the professorship, the decisionmaker had 
acknowledged that the male candidate had stronger research 
qualifications than the female candidate who was selected. The CJEU 
held that this positive action program was not permitted under the 
Equal Treatment directive because Marschall had only permitted a 
non-automatic sex-based preference to the equally qualified candidate 
of the underrepresented sex, and not to sufficiently but unequally 
qualified candidates. 29  This strong limitation on gender quotas 
remains the CJEU’s approach, and there is a tension between this 
jurisprudence and recent legislation in member states requiring quotas 
to achieve gender balance on corporate boards and other leadership 
roles. 
																																																																																																																												
25. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Kalanke, [1995] E.C.R. I-3053, ¶ 14. 
26. See Abrahamsson, [2000] E.C.R. I-5562. 
27. Id. ¶ 14. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. ¶ 45. 
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IV. MATERNITY 
In litigating positions and an opinion by the British Advocate 
General Slynn, Britain also shaped the European Court of Justice’s 
(“ECJ’s”) skeptical approach to the special protection of maternity in 
construing the Equal Treatment Directive. The European Commission 
brought a proceeding against France resulting in a judgment by the 
Court of Justice in 1988.30 The Court determined that France had 
failed to adopt Article 9(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive 
(76/207/EEC), specifically by adopting a law in 1983 that created 
special employment rights for mothers. Article 5 of the Directive 
required Member States to take measures necessary to ensure that 
“any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment which are 
included in collective agreements . . . . shall be, or may be declared 
null and void or may be amended.”31  Article 9 required Member 
States to adopt laws, regulations, or administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with the directive within 30 months. For France, 
the deadline was August 12, 1978, but in 1983, the French legislature 
adopted a statutory amendment to the Labor Code that gave rise to 
this litigation. The statutory amendment invalidated any terms of 
collective bargaining agreements reserving benefits to any employees 
on grounds of sex, but carved out an exception for any provisions 
relating to pregnancy, nursing, or pre-natal or post-natal rest.32 This 
statutory amendment was part of a larger statute purportedly 
guaranteeing equality between men and women at work. 
The French government defended the statute on the grounds that 
some special rights for women were motivated by a concern to protect 
women and to ensure their actual equality with men.33 The French 
Government understood the French statutory amendment to exempt a 
range of collective bargaining agreement provisions from legal 
nullification by the EU equal treatment implementation. Many 
collective agreements provided for maternity leaves longer than the 
statutorily required period, the shortening of working hours for 
women over 59 years of age, a younger retirement age than that 
																																																																																																																												
30. See Commission v. France, Case 312/86, [1988] E.C.R. 6332. 
31. See Council Directive 76/207 of 9 February 1976 on the Implementation of the 
Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, 
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, 1976 O.J. L 39/40, art. 5(2)(b). 
32. See Commission v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 6332, ¶ 3. 
33. See id. ¶ 7. 
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available to men, entitlement to leave to care for an ill child, 
additional days of annual leave calculated based on the number of 
children, a one-day leave at the beginning of the school year, time off 
work on Mother’s Day, daily breaks for women working on keyboard 
equipment or employed as typists or switchboard operators, the 
granting of extra points for pension rights in respect of second and 
subsequent children, and the payment of an allowance to mothers to 
cover the costs of childcare centers or babysitters. 
The Court of Justice acknowledged that the Equal Treatment 
Directive, while prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex, 
explicitly provides that the directive is “without prejudice either to 
provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as 
regards pregnancy and maternity, or to measures to promote equal 
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing 
inequalities which affect women’s opportunities . . . .”34 It conceded 
that, consistent with a recent decision resulting from a German 
preliminary reference,35 special protections for pregnant workers or 
those who have recently given birth were permitted by the directive. 
However, the Court insisted that the entitlements for mothers in many 
French collective agreements, as listed above, did not arise from 
pregnancy or childbirth. Furthermore, the Court rejected the French 
government’s framing of these motherhood protections as measures to 
promote equal opportunity for men and women, or measures to 
remove existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities. 
The reasoning and philosophy underscoring the Court’s ruling is 
set forth in the opinion of the Advocate General, Sir Gordon Slynn, 
who served as the British Advocate General to the ECJ from 1981-
1992. Slynn was particularly bothered by the French Government’s 
account of how the rights of mothers fit into the exception in the 
Equal Treatment Directive for measures to promote women’s equal 
opportunity.36  France had asked the Court to recognize the social 
reality of the role of mothers in French society. Collective agreements 
accorded special entitlements to mothers because they were “designed 
to take account of the situation existing in the majority of French 
																																																																																																																												
34. Id. ¶ 12 
35. Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, Case 184/83, [1984] E.C.R. 3048, at 3055. 
36. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Commission v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 6325, at 
6328. 
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households.”37 The Court concluded, however, that the special rights 
preserved in these agreements “relate to the protection of women in 
their capacity as older workers or parents – categories to which both 
men and women may equally belong.”38 While noting that both men 
and women “may” be parents, Slynn did not address the contention 
that, in most French households, women tend to do more parenting, 
which causes inequalities that the collective agreements attempt to 
alleviate. Later on in the opinion, Slynn pointed out: 
A father, in modern social conditions, may just as much be 
responsible for looking after sick children or need to pay 
childminders; he may no less for health reasons need to retire 
early or to have time off from some certain stressful jobs. 
France’s insistence on the traditional role of the mother, as I see 
it, ignores developments in society whereby some men in ‘single-
parent families’ have the sole responsibility for children or 
whereby parents living together decide that the father will look 
after the children, in what would traditionally have been the 
mother’s role, because of the nature of the mother’s 
employment.39 
With regard to time off accorded to adoptive mothers, Slynn 
noted, “it may be that in some Member States even quite a young 
child may be adopted by a man.”40 While it appears that France had 
argued that the mothers’ rights were a measure to compensate for the 
fact that mothers had faced discrimination and disadvantage in the 
labor market, Slynn’s simple response was that it was not permissible 
to argue “that any provisions in favour of women in the employment 
field are per se valid as part of an evening up process.”41 Following 
Slynn’s reasoning, the Court concluded, “The French Government has 
therefore not succeeded in demonstrating that the unequal treatment 
which forms the subject-matter of this application, and which it 
acknowledges, falls within the limits laid down by the directive.”42 In 
response to the French government’s contention that withdrawing 
these mothers’ rights from collective agreements would be a “socially 
																																																																																																																												
37. Commission v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 6332, ¶ 11. 
38. Id. ¶ 14. 
39. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Commission v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 6325, at 
6328. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Commission v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 6332, ¶ 16.  
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retrograde step,” Slynn noted that equality could be achieved “equally 
well” “by a levelling-up process applying the same benefits to men.”43 
Yet, neither Slynn’s opinion nor the Court’s ruling requires a 
levelling up process; it merely requires women and men to be treated 
the same with regard to entitlements associated with parenting. 
Through its Advocate General, Britain influenced European sex 
equality law in a way that caused tension with the motherhood 
protections that were enshrined in many postwar constitutions, 
including those of Germany,44 France,45 and Italy.46 British participat-
ion in these cases sustained a discourse imagining a larger role for 
men and fathers in parenting and caregiving, and questioning the 
traditional role of mothers in the family. At the same time, this 
discourse was committed to a largely formal concept of equality; it 
did not require the member-states to eradicate the disadvantages of 
motherhood so long as it treated mothers and fathers the same in their 
entitlement or non-entitlement to any social protections. 
V. RELIGION 
Finally, the coming absence of Britain from the EU has 
implications for the development of the EU-level norm against 
religious discrimination. The distinctive contribution of the United 
Kingdom is illustrated in the CJEU’s recent decisions evaluating 
employers who fired employees for wearing the Islamic headscarf in 
the workplace.47 UK Advocate General Sharpston issued an opinion48 
that was much more protective of the Islamic employee’s religious 
freedom in construing the scope of EU protection from religious 
discrimination than the approach taken by German Advocate General 
																																																																																																																												
43. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Commission v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 6325, at 
6330. 
44. GRUNDGESETZ [GG][BASIC LAW] art. 6(4), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0040 (Ger.). 
45. 1946 CONST. pmbl., § 10 (Fr.). 
46. Art. 27 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
47. Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, Case C-157/15, 2017, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0157; Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, Case C-
188/15, 2017, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62015CJ0188. 
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Juliane Kokott. 49  Although Kokott’s approach is closer to the 
reasoning adopted by CJEU, Sharpston’s opinion led the Court to 
limit the employer’s discretion to ban the headscarf, notwithstanding 
the Court’s decision to accept the employer’s pursuit of neutrality as a 
legitimate justification for banning the headscarf. 
In Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions, the Belgian Hof van 
Cassatie referred the case to CJEU, hearing an appeal in cassation of a 
labor court’s dismissal of the employee’s claim. Bougnaoui v. 
Micropole SA was referred by the French Cour de cassation, which 
was hearing an appeal of the Paris Cour d’Appel. Both the French 
Court of Appeal and the Labor Court had arrived at the conclusion 
that the employee’s wearing of the Muslim headscarf constituted a 
genuine and serious reason for the employee’s termination. In both 
cases, the employee claimed that a dismissal for failure to remove the 
Muslim headscarf in the workplace constituted discrimination on 
grounds of religious belief. Article 1 of Directive 2000/78 identifies 
its purpose as “to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation,” and, in 
that vein, prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination by 
employers on any of those grounds.50 
Both of the decisions turned on the construction of Article 4(1) 
of the directive, which permits differences of treatment “where, by 
reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned 
or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic 
constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, 
provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is 
proportionate.”51 In each of these cases, the employers put forth a 
justification for prohibiting the employee from wearing the veil. In 
the Bougnaoui case, the employee worked as a design engineer for a 
company specializing in advice, engineering and specialized training 
for the development and integration of decision-making solutions. A 
client of the firm had requested that Ms. Bougnaoui’s headscarf was 
upsetting to its employees, which then motivated the company’s 
																																																																																																																												
49. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Achbita, C-157/15, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62015CC0157. 
50. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Frame-
work for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. L 303/16, art. 1. 
51. Id. art. 4. 
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requirement that Ms. Bougnaoui stop wearing the headscarf.52 In the 
Achbita case, Ms. Achbita was a receptionist for G4S Secure 
Solutions, a company that provided security, guarding, and reception 
services to public and private sector entities. G4S had an unwritten 
company rule prohibiting employees from wearing any religious, 
political, or philosophical symbols while on duty. 
AG Kokott analyzed the employer G4S’s termination of the 
employee for wearing the headscarf as a form of indirect religious 
discrimination, with the central question being whether it could be 
justified as a proportionate pursuit of a legitimate aim. 53  Kokott 
understood G4S’s alleged aim to be a “policy of religious and 
ideological neutrality.” The Belgian discrimination legislation 
implementing Directive 2000/78 provides, consistent with the 
directive, that genuine occupational requirements pursuing a 
legitimate objective, in pursuit of which the requirement is 
proportionate, do not constitute discrimination. Kokott noted that the 
evaluation of legitimate aims was necessarily a normative exercise, to 
be undertaken in consideration of the EU’s fundamental values.54 
“For example,” she notes, “if an undertaking wished to create for 
itself a corporate identity that promoted an inhuman ideology, that 
course of action would be blatantly at odds with the fundamental 
values of the European Union.”55 In addition, Kokott notes, pointing 
to CJEU case law, that employer’s purely economic interest in 
pursuing its business and pandering to its clients for purely economic 
gain cannot be automatically accepted as a legitimate aim. 
Nonetheless, G4S’s policy of religious and ideological neutrality 
“does not exceed the bounds of the discretion it enjoys in the pursuit 
of its business.” On the contrary, the policy of neutrality is 
“absolutely crucial, not only because of the variety of customers 
served by G4S, but also because of the special nature of the work 
which G4S employees do in providing those services, which is 
characterized by constant face-to-face contact with external 
																																																																																																																												
52. See Bougnaoui, C-188/15, ¶ 14. 
53. Nonetheless, the opinion acknowledges and addresses at great length the possibility 
of framing the problem as direct discrimination. In Kokott’s view, both direct and indirect 
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54. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Achibita, C-157/15 ¶ 87. 
55. Id. ¶ 88. 
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individuals and has a defining impact not only the image of G4S itself 
but also and primarily on the public image of its customers.”56 
Next, in determining whether the headscarf ban is a 
proportionate means of achieving this legitimate aim, Kokott 
considers some less intrusive alternatives on the grounds that they do 
not advance the aim of neutrality. For example, it was argued that the 
employer could require the employee to wear a headscarf that 
matched the uniform; yet such a practice would still enable the 
employee to manifest her religion and thus violate the employer’s 
vision of neutrality. Kokott identified several factors relevant to 
proportionality analysis, including whether differences of treatment 
on other grounds, such as sex, are also present. Here, it was argued 
that a ban on religious and ideological symbols particularly burdened 
women. In response, Kokott notes:  
we should not rush into making the sweeping assertion that such 
a measure makes it unduly difficult for Muslim women to 
integrate into work and society . . . Ms Achbita worked as a 
receptionist for G4S for approximately three years without 
wearing an Islamic headscarf at work and was thus fully 
integrated into working life as a Muslim woman, despite the 
headscarf ban.57 
In sum, Kokott’s analysis of whether a private employer’s 
headscarf ban constitutes religious discrimination presents a vision of 
religious and ideological neutrality, as embraced by the private sector 
employer, as a furtherance of fundamental EU values. Banning the 
headscarf permits the workplace to be a neutral space for people with 
a plurality of religious and ideological leanings to provide services on 
equal terms. The headscarf ban is not discrimination, in large part 
because it plays a role, at least in some contexts, in furthering the 
equality goal of antidiscrimination legislation in diverse societies. 
AG Sharpston offers a contrasting approach. First, she draws a 
sharp distinction between the European Court of Human Rights’ 
approach of conflating religious discrimination with the right to 
religious freedom, and the proper approach to be taken by CJEU in 
enforcing Directive 2000/78’s prohibition of discrimination. In 
addition, unlike Kokott, she views the French employer’s termination 
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of the employee for wearing a headscarf during client contact as 
direct discrimination, not indirect discrimination. In the Bougnaoui 
case, it does not appear that the employer Micropole made any effort, 
like G4S in the Belgian case, to frame its action as a policy of 
religious and ideological neutrality. Rather, Micropole required the 
complainant to remove her headscarf during client meetings simply 
because the client experienced embarrassment due to the veil. Third, 
and very interestingly, Sharpston’s opinion presents sociological data, 
including the average percentage of Christians in EU member states, 
and perceptions of discrimination on grounds of religion in the 
member states, which she reports as being 66% in France and 60% in 
Belgium. 
Although Micropole had not presented its policy as one 
consciously pursuing religious neutrality or other values related to a 
democratic society, Sharpston refutes any potential effort to invoke 
such a justification. She notes at many points in the opinion that the 
French constitutional value of laïcité does not in general apply to 
employment relationships in the private sector (as recognized by the 
Cour de cassation itself). She says outright, “I reject the idea that a 
prohibition on employees wearing religious attire when in contact 
with customers of their employer’s business may be necessary for the 
protection of individual rights and freedoms which are necessary for 
the functioning of a democratic society.”58 She also expresses extreme 
skepticism of gender equality-based justifications for banning Muslim 
womens’ religious attire.59 
In Achbita, the CJEU largely followed AG Kokott’s opinion, and 
recognized the legitimacy of the employer’s aim of “a policy of 
political, philosophical, and religious neutrality,” and left it to 
referring courts to determine whether the means of achieving the aim 
was appropriate and necessary.60 The Court suggests that, as long as 
the employer applied the neutrality policy generally to the 
manifestation of political, philosophical, and religious beliefs, without 
singling out the Islamic headscarf, a neutrality policy that excluded 
the headscarf would not be discriminatory.61 
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In Bougnaoui, CJEU concludes that “the willingness of an 
employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to 
have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an 
Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement” within the meaning of the Directive 
2000/78/EC. Following a point on which Kokott and Sharpston seem 
to agree, the CJEU protects the employee wearing the headscarf only 
to the degree that the prohibition of the headscarf is premised merely 
on the preferences of the employer’s clients. Both of these judgments 
leave it legally possible for employers to fire employees for wearing 
the Islamic headscarf without being liable for discrimination on the 
basis of religion, but adopt standards that would make it difficult for 
the referring court to legitimize the terminations that occurred in these 
particular cases. Surely Sharpston’s strong arguments in favor of 
protecting religious liberty helped shaped these outcomes. With 
regard to the intersection of antidiscrimination protections and 
religious liberty, the absence of a British voice on the European 
judiciary may reduce the legal protections available to Muslim 
employees over time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this brief essay, I have examined the contributions of the 
United Kingdom, as litigant and through Advocates General, to the 
development of CJEU jurisprudence on antidiscrimination law. 
Britain shaped the indirect discrimination framework in a manner that 
initially tracked the US approach in Griggs. British participation also 
constrained gender quotas, both before the Court and in recent 
debates about proposed EU legislation requiring gender quotas on 
corporate boards. British participation has also encouraged a formal 
rather than substantive approach to sex classifications and the 
protection of maternity. Finally, the headscarf cases draw out some 
important differences in sensibility with regard to the legitimate aims 
that could potentially be pursued by employer restrictions on religious 
garb. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom’s contributions to EU 
antidiscrimination law over the last four decades have been so 
significant across a range of doctrines and problems that they will 
likely remain, even if Britain does not. 
 
 
